Union revitalization, coalition building and the high road
Labor-community coalitions are not a new concept. Unions approach such coalitions now, as in the past, as one way to enhance their bargaining power with an employer. Such coalitions are temporary and often issue-based. In recent years, however, some local labor movements have begun to look at coalitions in a broader way -as a means of improving their public image and building power in the political arena. This broad-based approach requires the development of coalitions for the longer run, not just for temporary expediency. This paper develops the notion of a high road social infrastructure as a way to understand how union leaders develop and sustain coalitions over time and find the resources they need to succeed in shaping economic development priorities for the region.
We define the "high road" in terms of a path of economic development that provides a high level of worker rights, skill investment, wages and benefits. Ideally, high-road businesses thrive by producing high-quality products and services. In exchange for high productivity and a commitment to innovation, employers have to pay high wages, provide good benefits and invest in training. The low road, by contrast, is a pattern of employer behavior that seeks competitiveness by lowering wages and shifting costs and risks onto workers. Because businesses do not usually pursue high road strategies their own, unions and public policy have to establish a framework of rules and organizational structures to regulate economic development in a way that closes off the low road and builds the high road.
Case study evidence suggests that union efforts to promote high road regional economic development are widespread in the global north. David Reynolds, for example, draws on the European experience to make sense of labor's high-road projects in U.S. urban regions (2002) .
Bruce Nissen (2004) takes the concept further in his discussion of the politics of coalition building, with an argument that unions should establish independent structures to carry out local high-road projects that, to some extent, allow the community to take the lead. Others have discussed central labor councils (Ness and Eimer 2001) and labor educators (Fricke and Totterdill 2004) as advocates of the high road. These studies emphasize the importance of organization building outside the structures of local unions as helpful in using coalitions to shape economic development.
Individual unionists acting as political entrepreneurs play a central role in most stories of coalition building. Fred Rose (2000) calls the leaders that stitch together coalitions "bridgebuilders." These leaders are comfortable in activist situations outside of the union's organizational boundaries and, in many cases, have personal histories in other social movements.
Coalition work does not require a "natural" community of interest; instead, it requires that leaders reframe issues and strengthen their personal relationships with activists in other social movements, in order to build coalitions across class lines. This process depends on the "strategic choice" of union leaders (see Turner's 
introduction to this volume).
Union leaders, however, tend to move on, and coalitions are too often only temporary.
Typically, the shared work of social action in committees or joint campaigns is the glue that holds coalitions together, and thus these coalitions survive only as long as all sides perceive the need to work together on concrete on-going issues. Labor's lasting contribution to a region, however, can be sustainable when coalition work becomes institutionalized -a matter of "business as usual." This is more likely to occur when unions and their partners set up organizations with paid staff to develop and administer projects to coordinate the shared work.
Such semi-autonomous organizations work outside the structure of unions and can therefore carry out projects that would be impossible if a single union were in charge. The common work of steering the organization through a governing board and carrying out the organization's ongoing projects provides the glue the keeps labor together with its community allies.
Institutionalizing coalition activity is important, because it creates a basis for further work, through what Lowell Turner calls "spillovers" (2004) . Observers of social movements have shown that campaigns, revolutions and other popular mobilizations occur in causally connected sequences (Tarrow, McAdam and Tilly 2001) . For example, the 1999 protests in Seattle against the World Trade Organization brought activists together in new ways, who then organized a series of international demonstrations and domestic campaigns in the following few years. In local politics, different events or campaigns are likewise interrelated. Individual protests or campaigns can have spillovers on their own; but organizations, with full-time staff managing projects, carrying out research, writing grants, lobbying and maintaining community ties, can create spillovers over a long period by launching projects and carrying out long-term relationship-building. This cycle of organization building and spillovers, catalyzed by individual union leaders, is the process through which high-road social infrastructures emerge.
Can sustained coalitions save the labor movement? Can they overcome well-known problems of uninspiring leadership, lack of concern for new organizing and blindness to broad community concerns? The literature on union revitalization has documented exceptions to the rule, where unions have reoriented themselves around organizing (Fantasia and Voss 2004; Voss and Sherman 2000; Bronfenbrenner, Friedman, Hurd, Oswald and Seeber 1998) or broad community concerns (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004; Milkman 2002) . Although these studies pose the problem well, they have either lacked a normative dimension (revitalization for what?) or treated coalitions as part of the intuitively powerful, but hard-to-define, phenomenon of revitalization. We find unions building infrastructures to engage with the economic development problems of their regions, in a way, however, that does not address the problem of declining membership.
The rest of this paper will examine this process in two very different cities: Seattle, Washington and Buffalo, New York. Seattle is an affluent, politically progressive city struggling with the contradictions of growth; Buffalo is a politically paralyzed city facing deindustrialization and population decline. Barriers to success, such as a past of laborcommunity conflict, a one-sided pro-business orientation in local government and the problems of racial segregation and deindustrialization, exist in both cities. Nevertheless, unionists, with an eye to coalitions and organization building, have reframed these barriers as problems to be solved. Drawing on cases from our earlier work (Greer and Fleron 2005; Byrd and Greer 2005) , we conclude by discussing the parallels of infrastructure building in the two cities. The SeattleBuffalo comparison shows that infrastructure building can work as a response to very different economic development challenges in very different political contexts.
Seattle
Seattle is a growing urban region with major concentrations of aerospace, transportation and research-related jobs. The metropolitan area has added about 200,000 jobs during the past 10 years, mainly in service and transportation industries, spurring an explosion in non-union work.
The University of Washington, the Port of Seattle, Boeing and Microsoft have been the central hubs of economic activity, serving as employers and attracting other firms. The largest unions are the building trades, teamsters, Boeing unions (IAM and SPEEA), public sector unions (NEA, AFSME, SEIU and IFPTE), construction and service unions (SEIU, UFCW and UNITE HERE).
In recent years, new locals have emerged to organize the growing precarious workforce, including graduate employees (UAW), homecare workers (SEIU) and technology workers (CWA-WashTech).
Although the economy as a whole has grown substantially in recent years, manufacturing industries -especially waterfront-oriented industries like shipbuilding -have struggled. In many of the growing industries, temporary, part-time and low wage work has replaced unionized fulltime middle-income jobs. The challenge for unions has been primarily to retain "good" jobs and to organize the new work that employers have created. They have been doing so primarily through a revitalized central labor council, the King County Labor Council (KCLC), which has engaged in coalitions around immediate union fights (initially via Jobs with Justice and eventually via its own internal Union Cities program), around economic development policy (via the Worker Center), around global justice issues (via the WTO protests and subsequent fair trade efforts) and around local elections (in coalition with environmental and other groups). Although the effect on union density has been modest at best, the effect on politics and policymaking has been dramatic (Byrd and Greer 2005) .
Seattle is historically an AFL town, with both strong conservative and progressive currents. Old AFL unions continue their predominance in service, construction, transport and manufacturing industries. Progressivism stretches back to the Seattle Central Labor Council of the early 20 th century, which operated a daily newspaper and organized the 1919 general strike.
Despite heroic moments, the events played into the hands of a right-wing populist mayor and left the labor movement deeply divided between progressivism and a rising tide of business unionism. During the 1920's, Seattle native Dave Beck began to organize workers in transport and related sectors into Teamsters locals throughout the west, using control over deliveries to win recognition. Beck formed close ties to the business community to "stabilize" sectors where union members worked and distributed the proceeds of the local monopolies as higher wages.
Conservatism continued to dominate through the civil rights era, as AFL-CIO leaders joined the building trades to resist demands for racial equality in hiring (from the community, from federal judges and from the Republican governor and county executive). worked with environmentalists to halt a major nonunion factory construction project.
As head of the building trades, Judd worked to heal relations with the minority community and participate in economic development using the mechanism of the Project Labor Agreement (PLA). By building a coalition involving owners of projects, community groups and unions, supported over time by the KCLC, he began to engage the minority community -mainly blacks, Asians and pacific islanders -in issues of job access. With support from the Port of Seattle, a long process began, in which the building trades council built cooperation between community groups, craft unions, governments and employers to desegregate the trades. Public owners of projects, like the Port and the City of Seattle found that the new regulations -built into the PLA -allowed them to connect public works to raising purchasing power in low-income neighborhoods. The hiring rules in the PLA provided employment opportunities for unionized workers, shut out contractors without apprentices, while making exceptions for non-union minority contractors (and, they claimed, to organize these contractors). By the early 2000's,
Project Labor Agreements requiring minimum levels of apprenticeship labor and setting targets for female and minority hiring were common on large public and private projects. The same activists who had sued the building trades in the 1970s over discrimination were now working with the trades to enforce apprenticeship and diversity standards. HERE members. The WC produced a study arguing for an employment policy for the 6,740
employees of subcontracted service providers at the airport, including expedited organizing campaigns, job security, stable contracting relations, wage minimums, training and career ladders. The port eventually agreed to retain collective bargaining. Clean energy has also been on the WC's agenda, and it has supported Washington State's Apollo Alliance, a coalition of unions and environmental organizations to promote job-friendly ecological energy policies.
Perhaps the high point of the Judd years came with the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, conducted by a massive coalition dealing with much bigger issues than the previous campaigns (Levi and Olson 2000) . The coalition included the full spectrum of organizations critical of the one-sided business orientation of the world's trade regime. Rather than taking on a specific employer, politician or public agency, these protests targeted the WTO as a symbol and agent of globalization. The KCLC's decision to push for massive labor involvement in the protests grew out of on-going concern of the WC and the KCLC about the impact of international trade on jobs and working conditions in the highly trade dependent Seattle area. In a strategic move that won practical assistance as well as credibility from the national labor movement, Judd convinced AFL-CIO leadership in Washington, DC to commit substantial staff and financial resources to the effort. To do so, he had to convince the AFL-CIO that the community coalition itself was a legitimate organization in Seattle and worth supporting, even though at times labor would have to bend to the will of the larger group.
The opportunity to work with other organizations in preparing for the protest was seen by Judd and others as a way to solidify pre-existing coalition-building activities. Beginning in early summer of 1999, meetings of interested organizations took place at the KCLC's headquarters building. The Direct Action Network, the Ruckus Society, the Sierra Club, the Citizen's Trade Campaign, the Labor and Employment Law Office (LELO) and the Church
Council of Greater Seattle all worked together in the months leading up to the meeting. They honed the message and organized the logistics for a 50,000-person demonstration, which eventually turned out almost 100,000 demonstrators from the Western U.S. and Canada. Sidran, who as City Attorney had carried out prosecutions of anti-WTO protestors and had allegedly ignored claims of unfair treatment by women workers in the City Attorney's office.
The KCLC thus threw its muscle into the race behind Nickels, who won the runoff election by a razor-thin margin, which he credited to labor. Nickels subsequently began pushing initiatives in cooperation with the KCLC and its affiliates, including promotion of affordable housing, cooperation with the immigrant workers' freedom ride, advocacy of Project Labor Agreements and a letter of support for striking grocery store workers.
As of mid-2005, Seattle's economy seems, once again, to be booming. Due to years of reforms and the electoral success of the Democrats in 2004, labor now has unprecedented access to public officials at the city, county and state levels. It remains to be seen, however, how unions will take advantage of their new channels of insider access at the Port of Seattle, the monorail board, the state legislature, and county and city councils. Furthermore, it is unclear how this new power will translate into a region-wide strategy, with the national AFL-CIO -as is currently planned -slashing its budget, combining county-sized labor councils into larger area labor federations and potentially losing dues from Change to Win affiliates. Lastly, the political gains are hardly a sure thing, even when the infrastructure is in place; labor's third candidate for the shift of resources to organizing, the CLC and its associated structures never spurred any push into the new economy that attracted many members, with the exception of a few specific worker groups like graduate students at the University of Washington.
Seattle's high-road infrastructure is a case of organized labor coming to terms with the local politics associated with the globalization of manufacturing, services and distribution. The KCLC has played a central role by connecting to these substantive issues and thereby winning new channels of influence in the region. In workforce development, unions used the building boom to heal their relations with the minority community and innovate in neighborhood economic development policy. In electoral politics, unions have strengthened both membership involvement and community cooperation; the successful outcomes have created new channels of insider influence. These coalition-building efforts are not merely ad-hoc marriages of convenience, but are part of an overall growth of organizations and relationships that, because of ongoing spillover effects from one project to another, has lasted nearly two decades. With no end in sight to Seattle's development boom and a string of visible payoffs from coalition work, organized labor is positioned to play a role in shaping the city's future.
Buffalo
Buffalo is union town facing a much deeper crisis in terms of job loss, social polarization and Buffalo's chief problems are deindustrialization and population decline, and neither politics nor free enterprise has served Buffalo very well in dealing with them. The "Queen City of the Great Lakes," once an economic powerhouse and the country's 10 th biggest city, is reeling from global competition, shifts of population and jobs to the Sunbelt and state policies that fail to stop the hemorrhage. Since 1970, the Buffalo-Niagara region has lost 200,000 residents and since 1950, the city of Buffalo's population has declined by more than half. In the public sector, a declining tax base has forced the city and county governments to lay off thousands of workers, despite a growing need for public services and good jobs. As the population has dispersed into the suburbs, social inequality has deepened. A racially diverse urban core with high unemployment and poverty rates has emerged, as the relatively affluent and overwhelmingly white suburbs have grown. This polarization and decline (Goldman 1983; Taylor 1990 ) have led to a search for public investment from the state and federal governments and a colorful local politics of Rockefeller republicanism, tax revolts and economic nationalism. Organizers estimated energy cost reductions by as much as 40% for downtown businesses, hospitals, government agencies, the public schools and housing projects.
Under the new scheme, local farmers will produce energy crops to fuel the plant, which will pollute less than the current system. The new facility will create a handful of skilled jobs downtown employed by a new nonprofit corporation. Despite some early difficulties in finding a company to provide technical expertise, the project raised $27 million by issuing bonds. Under phase one, involving an existing energy loop downtown, district energy will go online in late workers of contractors at city owned parking lots through voluntary compliance agreements with employers. The commission is also reviewing all city contracts for compliance and promoting improved contracting procedures within the city administration.
Unlike the EDG or Champions Network, the CEJ confronts low-road employers in a public and visible way. In the minds of union leaders, the CEJ fits into the overall scheme of labor's local development initiatives, because strike support, living wage enforcement and mobilizations around plant closures also aim to preserve good jobs. It operates alongside, and in cooperation with, other active coalitions in the region, including Champions and other singleissue coalitions devoted to occupational safety, child care and "economic self-sufficiency." In addition, it links local activists to national campaigns, such as Wal-Mart, Cintas and Sorrento.
CEJ is an example of social movement unionism, in the sense that it mobilizes broad community support for the struggles of workers and their unions.
As Buffalo's problems persist, union capacities to address them are growing. Although the population and some of the key manufacturing industries have stabilized in the region as a whole, suburbanization and public sector retrenchment continue. Cuts to city and local government services are especially painful, since they eliminate thousands of middle-income jobs and make it difficult for local government to address persistent social needs. At the same time, the CLC leadership, which until 2005 was not deeply involved in coalition work, has changed. The new leader, unlike the former one, has been involved both in EDG and the Champions Network, and has begun to give the CLC a more active role in carrying out local coalition work.
Buffalo's high road infrastructure is a case of unions coming to terms with the policy concerns associated with the globalization of manufacturing and the decline of a region. Despite differences in the problems unions face and the key actors building community partnership, Buffalo's unionists, like those in Seattle, have found ways to institutionalize their partnerships with the broader community. Champions, EDG and CEJ are three faces of this development, organizing regional partnerships, development projects and contentious mobilization. While social movement unionism may seem inconsistent with labor-management partnership, the same individuals push both approaches. As Buffalo's chronic job crisis deepens and moves to the public sector, support within the local labor movement for the high road infrastructure grows.
Labor's coalition work continues to spill over into ever more ambitious initiatives. Nevertheless, these infrastructures have much in common. Unions set up a series of organizations to design policies, administer programs, seek funding, lobby, mobilize and maintain relations with partners. The infrastructures grow from project to project, and each project sets up relationships and raises issues that can lead to more coalition work. In both cities, the policies involve integrating minority workers into middle-income construction jobs in the name of connecting building to a more egalitarian form of economic development. Labor faces the same kinds of opponents in both cities -anti-union contractors' associations opposed to the building trades' market stabilization efforts, organized companies where strikes occur, and nonunion companies where organizing drives take place. While these businesses take on the unions as opponents, others ally themselves with unions. Unionized contractors implementing new workforce development programs (and winning contracts in the process) and the broad labormanagement partnership sponsored by the Champions Network are two examples. Individual union leaders play a key role in both cases by finding partners and cementing cooperation by setting up new organizations with staff.
High Road Social Infrastructures
Organizing of new workers remains missing from the form of union revitalization discussed here, even if being "part of the solution" improves unions' chances of winning the hearts and minds of unorganized workers. While Seattle is home to many organizing unions, the KCLC has managed to support, though not to initiate organizing drives. During the 1990s, the KCLC's attempt to create a more pro-active multi-union approach to expanding organizing efforts failed. Similarly, in Buffalo, organizing unions exist. At the EDG, however, the link to organizing is absent even in theory, and CEJ activists bemoan the lack of requests to support new organizing. In practice, the infrastructure cannot support organizing if (1) local unions are not organizing new workers, (2) local unions do not approach these organizations for help, or (3) local unions as a whole do not reach a consensus that it makes sense for the infrastructure to support organizing more directly. These, at least, are the obstacles in Seattle and Buffalo.
